Abstract. Propositional Dynamic Logics (PDL's) provide a suitable formal framework for modeling actions and reasoning about them. However, the basic language of PDL's lack several features that are important for a sophisticated treatment of actions. In this paper, we present a new logic that is obtained by enriching the basic PDL with powerful modeling constructs that allow us to represent determinism and nondeterminisms, concurrency, hierarchies, mutual exclusion, backward execution, and non-execution of actions. We demonstrate, by means of examples, the expressive power of the formalism. In particular, we show that although nonmonotonicity is not generally captured by PDL's, our logic is perfectly suited for exploiting monotonic solutions to the frame problem. Finally, we establish that the proposed formalism is decidable, and that the basic reasoning problems are EXPTIME-complete.
Introduction
Propositional Dynamic Logics (PDL's) are modal logics for describing and reasoning about system dynamics in terms of states and actions (or events) modeled as relations between states (see 19, 15, 23] for surveys on PDL's, see also 31] for a somewhat di erent account). The basic language of PDL includes atomic propositions, that are interpreted as simple properties of states, plus the construct R] , where is a formula and R is an action, whose meaning is that all executions of the action R terminate in a state where is true. The action R can be either atomic or complex, i.e. constituted by sequential composition, nondeterministic choice, iteration, or test.
PDL's have been originally developed in Theoretical Computer Science to reason about program schemas 9], and their variants have been adopted to specify and verify properties of reactive processes (e.g., Hennessy Milner Logic 16, 22] , modal mu-calculus 18, 20, 31] ). In Arti cial Intelligence, PDL's have been extensively used in establishing decidability and computational complexity results of many formalisms: for example they have been used in investigating Common Knowledge 14] Though PDL's have been only sparingly adopted for reasoning about actions (main exceptions being 28, 17] , but also 4]) there are two signi cant arguments that make them attractive.
1. Transition systems are the semantics adopted by an increasing number of proposal in reasoning about actions (see for example 3]). Transition systems are exactly the semantics underling PDL's. 2. Reiter's work on cognitive robotics 24, 26, 27, 21] has somewhat diverged the interest from nonmonotonic solutions to the frame problem, by illustrating that monotonic solutions are often very succinct. Now, while PDL's generally do not capture nonmonotonicity,they allow for exploiting the epistemological insight of the monotonic solutions to the frame problem, as shown later (see also 8]). The general advantages PDL's o er in reasoning about actions are, on the one hand, the ability of expressing nondeterministic and complex actions, and, on the other hand, the availability of sophisticated tools for studying their computational aspects such as decidability, complexity, and reasoning algorithms.
In this paper we propose a very powerful Propositional Dynamic Logic, DIFR, which o ers an e ective framework to model and reason about actions.
The logic extends the previous formalisms in many ways. It allows for boolean expressions of atomic actions by which we can denote both the concurrent execution and the nonexecution of actions. It allows for expressing interdependencies between atomic actions such as specialization or mutual exclusion. It also includes constructs to impose the determinism of boolean combinations of atomic actions and their inverse. Notably, the logic is decidable and its computational complexity is EXPTIME (tight bound) as for the simplest PDL 9] . The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we introduce the logic DIFR both formally and intuitively; In Section 3 we illustrate, by means of examples, the use of DIFR in modeling and reasoning about actions; In Section 4 we discuss DIFR main features individually and we draw some conclusions.
2 The logic DIFR Formulae in the logic DIFR are of two sorts: action formulae and state formulae.
Action Formulae describe properties, by means of boolean operators, of atomic actions -i.e., actions that cannot be broken in sequences of smaller actions. The abstract syntax of action formulae is as follows:
::= P j any j 1^ 2 j 1 _ 2 j : where P denotes a primitive action, and any denotes a special atomic action that can be thought of as \the most general atomic action". Observe that an atomic action denoted by an action formulae is composed, in general, by a set of primitive actions intended to be executed in parallel.
State Formulae describe properties of states in terms of propositions and complex actions. The abstract syntax for state formulae is as follows:
::= A j > j ? j 1^ 2 j 1 _ 2 j : j R] j hRi j (funr) r ::= j ? R ::= r j R 1 _ R 2 j R 1 ; R 2 j R j ? j R ? where A denotes a primitive proposition, > denotes \true", ? denotes \false", (possibly with subscript) denotes a state formula,r denotes a simple action which is either an atomic action or the inverse of an atomic action (i.e, set of primitive actions or of inverse of primitive actions), and nally R (possibly with subscript) denotes a complex action composing simple actions by nondeterministic choice, sequential composition, re exive transitive closure, test, and inverse.
Let us explain the intuitive meaning of some formulae: the action formula P 1^P2 means \perform P 1 and P 2 in parallel"; :P means \don't perform P". In general an atomic formula denotes a set of primitive actions that are performed in parallel and a set that are not performed at all (note that primitive actions that are not in these sets could be performed as well -i.e., we are adopting an open semantics for action formulae).
By forcing the validity of action formulae we can represent hierarchies of atomic actions, for example by climb stairs ) climb 1 Turning to state formulae: R] expresses that after every performance of the action R the property is satis ed; hRi expresses that after some performance of the action R the property is satis ed -i.e. the execution of R can lead to a state where holds (recall that actions are nondeterministic in general).
The formula hRi> expresses the capability of performing R; R]? expresses the inability of performing R; :r]? expresses the inability of performing any atomic actions other than those denoted by r; :any]? expresses the inability of performing any atomic actions at all; hanyi>^ :r]? expresses the necessity or inevitability to perform some of the atomic actions denoted by r.
The construct (fun r) called functional restriction allows us to impose that the performance of a simple action r (i.e., an atomic action or the inverse of an atomic action) is deterministic. Hence r] ^(funr) expresses that if the atomic action r is performed, then it deterministically leads to a state where holds. Note that this does not implies that the action r can be performed.
The formula hri ^(funr) expresses that atomic action r can be performed and deterministically leads to a state where holds. Propositional Dynamic Logics are subsets of Second Order Logic, or, more precisely, of First Order Logic plus Fixpoints. Typical properties that are not rst order de nable are: hR i , which expresses the capability for performing R until holds, and is equivalent to the least xpoint of the operator X:( _ hRiX); R ] , which expresses that holds in any state reachable from the current one by performing R any number of times, and is equivalent to the greatest xpoint of the operator X:( ^ R]X). Interesting special cases of the last formula are: any ] , which expresses that holds from now on -i.e., no matter how the world evolves from the current state will be true; and (any_any ? ) ] , which expresses that holds in the whole connected component containing the current state (the state in which the formula holds).
The formal semantics of DIFR is based on the notion of Kripke structure or transition system, which is de ned as a triple M = (S; fR R g; V), where S denotes a set of states, fR R g is a family of binary relations over S, such that each action R is given a meaning through R R , and V is a mapping from atomic propositions to subsets of S such that V(A) determines the states where the proposition A is true. The family fR R g is systematically de ned as follows: R any S S; R P R any ; R 1^ 2 = R 1 \ R 2 ; R 1 _ 2 = R 1 R 2 ; R : = R any ? R ; R ? = f(s 1 ; s 2 ) 2 S S j (s 2 ; s 1 ) 2 R g; R r = R if r = ; R r = R ? if r = ? ; R R1_R2 = R R1 R R2 ; R R1;R2 = R R1 R R2 (seq. comp. of R R1 and R R2 ); R R = (R R ) (re . trans. closure of R R ); R R ? = f(s 1 ; s 2 ) 2 S S j (s 2 ; s 1 ) 2 R R g; R ? = f(s; s) 2 S S j M; s j = g:
Note that actions (even primitive actions) are nondeterministic in general.
The conditions for a state formula to hold at a state s of a structure M, Observe that logical implication is already EXPTIME-complete for the basic modal logic K (which corresponds to a Propositional Dynamic Logic including just one primitive action, no functional restrictions, and no action constructor at all).
Examples
Below we show the power of DIFR in modeling a dynamically changing world by means of two examples. We remark that those examples do not aim at providing the de nitive DIFR-based formalizations of the scenarios they describe, nor they exhaust the possibility of using DIFR in representing and reasoning about We also need to specify when the actions lift left and lift right can be performed simultaneously. With the next axiom we assert that they can be performed simultaneously simply if they both can be performed individually:
hlift left^lift righti> hlift lefti>^hlift righti>:
Actions have e ects if they can be performed 5 3 Note that (contrary to what is usually assumed in situation calculus) actions are not necessarily deterministic in DIFR. 4 Note that hri> have the same role as Poss(a;s) in Reiter's situation calculus. 5 Note that state formulae of the form a] have the same role as Poss(a;s) ) (do(a;s)) which is a common formula con guration in Reiter's situation calculus 24, 27] . We adopted the last three axioms for sake of brevity.
Let us call ? the set of the axioms above and let the starting situation be described by S : = vase on table^down left side^down right side: Then we can make the following two inferences. On the one hand: oor, then lifting rst the left side without lifting the right side and then the right side, has as a result that the vase is fallen. Notice that the above inferences don't say anything about the possibility of performing the actions described, however this possibility is guaranteed by ? j = S ) hlift left^lift righti> and ? j = S ) h(lift left^:lift right); lift right)i> respectively. Example: Making the heating operative We want to make our (gas) heating operative. To do so we need to strike a match, to turn its gas handle on and to ignite the security ame spot. To strike a match we need to concurrently press the match against the match box and rub it until it res.
We make the following intuitive assumption: the past is backward linear that is from any state there is only one accessible (immediately) 24, 27] . There are two main di culty in following this approach in PDL: the rst is that, as in any modal logic, we can directly refer to just one state the \current one", the second is that we cannot quantify on atomic actions. In DIFR we can overcome these di culties. By assuming (funany ? ) from the current state we can univocally refer back to the previous state through the action any ? . On the other hand by using the action any we can simulate the universal quanti cation on atomic actions. Hence we proceed as follows from the current state we make a step forward and then we model the various condition backward. This leads to the following frame axioms: For example the last axiom says: \consider any successor state (such a state has exactly one previous state which is the current state), if the heating is operative in such a state then either it was operative in the previous state or the action ignite flame spot was just performed and the gas was open in the previous state". 6 Let us call ? the set of all these axioms, and let the starting situation be described by S :
= :open gas^:match lit^:heating operative 6 The frame axioms can be proved to be equivalent to the following ones (respecting the order The last axiom says: \if the heating is not operative then every performance of an atomic action not including ignite flame spot and every performance of any action starting from a state in which the gas is not open, leads to a state where the heating is still not operative".
The rst inference we are interested in is the following:
? j = S ) hany iheating operative i.e., there is a sequence of action (a plan) starting from a situation described by S resulting in making the heating operative. Assuming all primitive actions to be deterministic, inferences of the form ? j = S ) hany iG are the typical starting point in planning synthesis 11]: if the answer is yes then from the proof we can generate a working plan to achieve the goal G starting from an initial situation described by S. The dual of the above inference ? j = S ) any ]:G is of interest as well: it establishes that there are no plan at all achieving a given goal G starting from a situation described be S. Next inference says that the complex action \strike a match turn on the gas, ignite the control ame spot" results in making the heating operative:
? j = hwhile :match lit do (press^push); turn on gas; ignite flame spot iheating operative Note that the similar action \turn on the gas, strike a match, ignite the control ame spot" is not guaranteed to make the heating operative.
? 6 j = hturn on gas;
while :match lit do (press^push);
ignite flame spot iheating operative
The reason why above the complex action may fail is because the gas could be turned o while we are trying to strike the match. The problem of checking inferences as the two above is known as projection problem (see e.g. 26]). A typical projection problem as the form: Does G hold in the state reachable from initial situation described by S by executing the (complex) action ? This corresponds to checking the inference below:
? j = S ) h iG:
We have seen that executing the complex action \turn on the gas, strike a match, ignite the control ame spot" may fail to make the heating operative. If this is the case, the following inference tells us that the gas has been turned o before striking the match succeeded:
? j = hturn on gas;
while The ability of specifying the performance of di erent atomic actions concurrently. This characteristic, illustrated in the examples of Section 3, is one of the most original aspects of DIFR. Indeed, the attention to reason about concurrent actions has emerged only recently. DIFR takes into account concurrency of actions that cannot be interrupted (atomic actions in our terminology). Obviously further work has to be done for capturing more general forms of concurrency. In this context, we argue that it is relevant for the AI community to look at the vast computer science literature on modeling concurrent processes.
The ability of specifying the \non-execution" of atomic actions. This feature called for a careful de nition of the notion of \non-executing an action". In our approach, this notion has been formulated by interpreting it as \the execution of some action other than a given one". Observe that it is essentially this feature that allows us to provide a compact representation of the frame axioms, as illustrated in the examples above.
The ability of structuring atomic actions. In particular, DIFR allow the designer to organize actions in hierarchies, where actions are related by means of two basic mechanisms: one for stating that an action is a specialization of another one, and the other for representing mutual exclusion between actions. 7 Observe that 0 (a) could be true (executed) before the starting of in the formulation above. To avoid this we need to distinguish the initial state, for example by assuming that the initial situation does not have a past, which can be done by including in S the state formula any ? ]?.
The ability of distinguishing deterministic and nondeterministic atomic actions. Note that in DIFR the determinism or nondeterminism of an atomic action may be modeled on a state-to-state basis. This ability provides the designer with more expressive power with respect to the case where actions are assumed to be always deterministic. Indeed in this last case there is no distinction between nondeterminism and incomplete knowledge about the situation resulting from executing an action (see for example 2]).
The ability of expressing properties of both future and past states. In particular, the usual linearity of the past can be asserted. This ability makes our logic capable to reason about not only projection problems but also historical queries. Some examples of these have been provided in Section 3.
The result on the computational properties of DIFR shows that the logic is decidable, which means that reasoning procedure that are sound, complete, and terminating are available. Space limitations prevented us to elaborate more on this issue, the interested reader is referred to 5] for a deep investigation.
